Introduction
Imagine a world where lawmakers enact a catalog of precisely tailored laws, specifying the exact behavior that is permitted in every situation. The lawmakers have enough information to anticipate virtually all contingencies, such that laws are perfectly calibrated to their purpose-they are neither over-nor underinclusive. Now imagine that when a citizen in this world faces a legal decision, she is clearly in formed of exactly how to comply with every relevant law before she acts. This citizen does not have to weigh the reasonableness of her actions, nor does she have to search for the content of a law. She just obeys a simple directive. The laws at work in this world are not traditional rules and standards. Instead, they take a new form that cap tures the benefits of both rules and standards without incurring the costs. This new form-we call it the microdirective-is the future of law.
When lawmakers enact laws today, they must choose between using rules and using standards to achieve a desired goal.1 This choice requires a trade-off between certainty and calibration. Rules provide certainty through clear ex ante statements of the content of the law.2 But rules are costly to design because lawmakers must, at the instantly based on all relevant factors.7 In effect, this lowers the cost o f designing precise, finely calibrated laws.
The second technology to consider is communication technology. Ubiquitous and instantaneous communication capabilities will reduce the uncertainty o f law. From the vast catalog o f rules generated by predictive technology, communication tech nology will be able to identity the rules applicable to an actual situation and inform the regulated actor exactly how to comply with the law.8 It will be able to translate all the information into a single behavioral directive that individuals can easily follow.
To see how the mechanism might work, consider the regulation o f traffic speed. In a world o f rules and standards, a legislature hoping to optimize safety and travel time could enact a rule (a sixty miles-per-hour speed limit) or a standard ("drive reasonably"). With microdirectives, however, the law looks quite different. The legislature merely states its goal. Machines then design the law as a vast catalog o f context-specific rules to optimize that goal. From this catalog, a specific micro directive is selected and communicated to a particular driver (perhaps on a dashboard display) as a precise speed for the specific conditions she faces. For example, a microdirective might provide a speed limit o f 51.2 miles per hour for a particular driver with twelve years o f experience on a rainy Tuesday at 3:27 p.m. The legisla tion remains constant, but the microdirective updates as quickly as conditions change.
In this Article, we explore whether this example could become the model for law more broadly. Our long-run prediction is that microdirectives will become the domi nant form o f law, culminating in the death o f rules and standards. But even if that full evolution does not happen, microdirectives are certain to become a viable alter native for many laws. This short-run phenomenon is o f great importance, as even a limited spread o f microdirectives has the potential to change the way laws are struc tured and thought about generally.
This advent o f microdirectives may take various paths. In the simplest story, the legislature uses the new technology and communicates the command to the citizen. We use this example to illustrate the concept. More realistically, however, the tech nology will often be implemented at the administrative level by regulators and en forcement agencies. Lawmakers may still enact standards, but administrative agents will convert them to microdirectives. A third possibility is that private citizens will generate the microdirectives. Citizens using private predictive technology may inform themselves o f the most reasonable action in any particular situation. As that private technology gets better, two things will happen. First, failure to use the tech nology will become a per se violation o f a legal standard. And, second, the technol ogy will be able to predict judicial outcomes. Both effects will result in citizens using private technology to derive a simple microdirective for how to comply with the law.
For all o f these paths, the result is that laws that look like standards to the legisla tures will appear as simple and easy-to-follow directives to the regulated individual. This form o f law is neither a standard nor a rule. It provides the certainty o f a rule and the calibration o f a standard, with none o f the decision costs associated with either. Moreover, the law, in application, morphs from a standard (for the legislature) to a set o f complex rules (within the machine process) to a simple command (for the citizen).
We describe the rise o f microdirectives as the death o f rules and standards. One might alternatively frame the coming change simply as the death o f standards. After all, microdirectives are ex ante rules that govern behavior. The driver in our example is told exactly how to behave ex ante. In that framing, technology has reduced the cost o f precise ex ante rule making. Rules will no longer be over-and underinclusive. As a result, the rationale for using standards goes away. That is consistent with the conventional law-and-economics definition o f a rule as having ex ante content (rela tive to the regulated actor). But the lawmakers are not enacting rules. The lawmakers need not spend the time to prescribe precise rules. They can enact broad standards and let the machines do the rest. Indeed, from the perspective o f the lawmakers, it is the death o f rules. The framing is less important than the recognition that micro directives will change the foundational nature o f law.'* Our analysis is positive rather than normative. One might think o f perfect calibra tion o f laws to legislative goals as problematic in a system with multiple branches and checks and balances. Indeed, our analysis implies a reduced role forjudges and perhaps the need for institutional reforms to preserve important aspects o f our current system. Others may view microdirectives as a threat to privacy and autonomy. The easier it is for the government to learn information about the behavior o f an individ ual and use technology to predict outcomes, the more the government can micromanage to achieve desired social results. Finally, some may have concerns about ethics and moral health in a world where many important decisions are auto m ated.9 10 We do not take a side on these normative questions. We do, however, try to flag the areas where the thorniest normative questions will arise.
The primary contribution o f this Article is to explore the most far-reaching effects 9. This question of framing suggests an interesting semantic deficit in the way legal academics talk about rules and standards. Readers of our earlier drafts have been equally split on what it means to call something a rule. Some infer that the label "rule" denotes an ex ante statement of content from the lawmaker. Others infer that it denotes an ex ante instruction for the regulated individual, that disconnect does not matter much with traditional lawmaking. But as microdirectives proliferate, the tension will come to the forefront. As a result, not only do actual rules and standards die, but so too does the meaningful use of those words to label the laws that exist.
10. See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues o f Fog, 123 IIarv. L. Rf.v. 1214 Rf.v. . 1222 Rf.v. , 1244 Rf.v. (2010 (standards provide for ethical decision making important to moral health). [Vol. 92:1401 of technology on the general structure of law. This contribution builds on and con nects with two strands in the law-and-technology literature. The first strand looks at the effects that predictive technology has on the legal services industry." The second strand looks at the nature of personalized default rules. 12 We suggest, however, that these strands understate the momentous effect that the coming technological revolution will have on law.1 ' By connecting the growing lit erature on technology and the law to the literature on rules and standards, we show that the same technology that will bring us automated compliance lawyers and per sonalized default rules will also bring us the microdirective.14 And that change in the form o f law will have broader consequences than retail personalization of law. In deed, microdirectives have the potential to bring wholesale institutional changes to our entire system o f laws and the way we choose to regulate behavior.
11. Some scholars predict the effects of technology on legal services. Richard Rev. 1417 Rev. (2014 . Porat & Strahilevitz provide a theory of personalized default rules in a world of big data. Wejump off from that point to explore the wholesale effects of technological advances on law more generally. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 627 (2016) ; George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision o f Contract Default Rules, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 1109 Rev. (2006 ; Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2013) .
13. The closest work to ours is that of John McGinnis and Steven Wasick. McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1. though they reach strikingly different conclusions, McGinnis and Wasick begin in the same place as we do, asking how technological advances that reduce information costs will affect the balance of rules and standards. Focusing primarily on legal search technology and the ability to predict judicial outcomes, they predict a world where standards and dynamic rules are favored over simple rules. Id. at 1049-50. Building on this analysis, we add in the effects of communication technology and machine learning to show that standards and rules (simple and dynamic) will no longer be viable forms of law.
14. Porat & Strahilevitz note that the dichotomy of personal and impersonal rules is not the same as the dichotomy of rules and standards. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 1457-58 . Personalized defaults can be rules or standards. And impersonal defaults also come in both forms. Id. Beyond that observation, Porat and Strahilevitz focus their attention on the personalimpersonal dichotomy. Our analysis suggests, however, that all laws-both personal and impersonal-will ultimately gravitate toward microdirectives that transcend the distinction between rules and standards.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out our general theory of micro directives and provides demonstrative examples. Part II explores the feasibility of the technologies behind microdirectives. Part III discusses implications and broader consequences of the rise of microdirectives and the death of rules and standards. A final section concludes.
I. T he Em er g en c e of M ic r o d ir e c t iv e s a n d th e D eclin e o f Rules a n d Standards
In this Part, we spell out how technology will affect the administration of law and the structure of legal content. We outline two types of technology that will lead to a dramatic reduction in the cost of calibrating and communicating ex ante legal direc tives, thereby eliminating the need to choose between rules and standards. The analy sis is presented in three sections. First, we briefly review the distinction between rules and standards and outline the cost choices presented by the dichotomy. Second, we set out our core theory that technology will fundamentally change those cost choices. We provide two examples to demonstrate how predictive and communica tion technologies will pave the way for microdirectives that capture the benefits of both rules and standards. Third, we discuss how the emergence of microdirectives can take place through different branches of lawmaking or can be driven by private actors with access to predictive technology.
A . Background: Rules and Standards
Rules are precise and ex ante in nature. Rules indicate to an individual whether certain behavior will violate or comply with the law. When a rule is enacted, effort must be undertaken by lawmakers to give full and precise content to the law before the individuals act. Standards, on the other hand, are imprecise when they are en acted. 15 The exact content of the law comes after an individual acts, as judges and other adjudicators determine whether the individual's specific behavior in a particu lar context violates the standard.
Generally, lawmakers incur both error costs and decision costs when enacting a law. Error costs arise when a law is over-or underinclusive; the law allows behavior that should be prohibited, or prohibits behavior that should be allowed.16 Errors can be reduced as lawmakers exert greater effort to get the law right. But this requires information and deliberation. Reducing error costs imposes decision costs on the lawmakers. Additionally, regulated individuals face a cost in figuring out whether their behavior complies with the law. When the application of the law to a particular situation cannot be easily predicted, the individual incurs cost of legal uncertainty.
Error, decision, and uncertainty costs arise in different ways for rules and stand ards. The classic models in the rules-versus-standards literature conclude that, for 15. Standards are found wherever vague and ambiguous terms such as "reasonable," "material," or "excessive" arc used in the law. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 308-09; Schauer, supra note 2, at 804-05.
16. McGinnis & Wasick, supra note I, at 1031.
[Vol. 92:1401 several reasons, standards tend to perform better when the behavior of the regulated actors is infrequent and heterogeneous.17 First, when behavior of regulated actors is infrequent, standards generate lower decision costs because the content of the law only needs to be decided in the in frequent event that the relevant context actually arises. Rules, on the other hand, re quire ex ante decisions about all future possible scenarios. Where behavior is in frequent and heterogeneous, lawmakers must make many more decisions if they want to write rules that are as precise in application as a standard that is adjudicated ex post would be. Rules do, however, impose lower decision costs when behavior is frequent and homogeneous. Economies of scale kick in and a law need only be en acted once rather than litigated over and over again. 18 Second, error costs for standards are lower when behavior is infrequent and het erogeneous because the adjudicator determining the content of the law ex post has more information than the ex ante lawmaker. The adjudicator has additional context not available to the ex ante lawmaker and has the benefit of hindsight in identifying which factors are relevant.
On the other hand, adjudicator competency and bias complicate this simple model of error costs.19 Ex post adjudication may suffer from hindsight bias20 and from bi ases based on the personal characteristics of particular individuals.21 Such biases can manifest themselves in arbitrariness, political favoritism, covert influence, inconsistency, and discretionary justice22 even when judges believe they are being unbiased.2'
Ex ante lawmakers and regulators may, o f course, also be biased.2 ' But the biases exhibited in ex post adjudication are particularly costly. Hindsight bias is more per vasive and difficult to minimize for ex post adjudication. Additional biases based on personal characteristics o f an individual are also more likely for ex post adjudication and may be particularly pernicious and harmful to social objectives. 25 The presence o f biased adjudicators, thus, alters the error-cost trade-offs between rules and stand ards and weakens any claims that standards have lower error costs.
A third cost comparison is also relevant when assessing the relative merits o f rules and standards: the uncertainty cost imposed on the regulated actor in understanding whether her behavior complies with the law. Uncertainty about the content o f a law is greater with standards than with simple rules. When regulated by a simple rule, an individual will more likely know whether her behavior is allowed or prohibited.2 < > When regulated by a standard, on the other hand, the individual does not know how any particular judge with wide discretion will apply the standard to the facts. She may not know what behavior a judge will consider reasonable.
The choice between using a rule or a standard to achieve a particular policy ob jective is therefore a question o f weighing and trading off these costs. We predict that advances in technology will fundamentally change that trade-off. Rev. 1023 Rev. , 1056 Rev. -58 (2000 (noting the lack of attention to the behavioral biases of regulators); Stephen .1. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 20-36 (2003) (cataloguing the biases affecting SEC regulators).
25. For our purposes, the important observation will be that machine-created rules are less likely to be biased than humans in making rules or applying standards. Our analysis suggests that given a legislative goal, machines will more faithfully implement that objective. See infra Part II. It is possible, still, that judges are debiasing bad legislative policy (though some empirical evidence suggests otherwise). In that case, judges have the power to override and influence policy in a way that may be socially beneficial. That power will be lost as standards die. We address these issues in Part III.
26. This assumes that judges (and juries) follow rules. They may, however, import exceptions that turn rules into standards-or ignore the rules altogether. See Schaucr, supra note 3, at 312-14. For the most part we bracket the possibility of such rule nullification. But it is worth noting that the developments we explore make nullification less likely as well. See infra Part UFA (discussing the diminished capacity for judges to influence and change legal substance and policy). This is yet another way that law will become more rule based from the perspective of the regulated individual.
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B. Technology Will Facilitate the Emergence o f Microdirectives as a New Form o f Law
Two types of technology will lead to the death of rules and standards and the rise of microdirectives: predictive technology and communication technology. The first will facilitate lawmakers' efforts to craft precise ex ante context-specific rules that provide the nuance and specificity traditionally associated with standards. The second will allow for the translation of those nuanced and specific laws into simple directives that are communicated to the regulated actors in a timely manner.
Predictive Technology. Predictive technology, driven by ever increasing compu tational capacity, will allow lawmakers to sculpt more perfect ex ante laws.27 Com putation power is growing at exponential rates. The consistent trend o f the last fifty years suggests that that power will, by the end of this century, be more than one trillion times greater than what it is today.28 With even a fraction of that processing power, tomorrow's computers will be able to gather and analyze more facts than any human lawmaker or judge. Lawmakers will be able to direct a machine to analyze a massive amount of data instantly to predict which rules can precisely achieve a policy objective.
Relying on the machines to observe and analyze more relevant facts, lawmakers will make better predictions about the impact of a law and will face reduced error costs. Lawmakers will no longer have to think up rules to enact laws. Judges will no longer have to examine citizens' decisions on a case-by-case basis in order to apply laws. And the laws will be highly calibrated to policy objectives with no chance of judges introducing bias or incompetence. O f course, the calibration need not be per fect, it only needs to be better than the calibration associated with the alternatives of legislated rules and adjudicated standards.
As a practical matter, the result will be a new hybrid form of law that is both rule and standard. The lawmaker can set a broad objective, which might look like a stand ard. But the predictive technology will take the standard and engineer a vast catalog of context-specific rules for every scenario. But that is only the first half of the 29 story." 27. In a different context, Professor Michael Abramowicz identified the power of predictive decision making to "take[j advantage of the best of both the world of standards and the world o f rules." Michael Abramowicz, Predictive Decisionmaking, 92 Va. L. Rev. 69, 74 (2006 29. The discussion of predictive technology here and throughout this Article assumes a consequcntialist approach to law. For a consequentialist, the content of the law is driven by a prediction of the outcome o f behavior. For nonconsequentialist theories, the use o f the technology is slightly different. But the trend toward microdirectives will likely be the same. For example, imagine that a lawmaker wants to prohibit certain behavior she deems immoral Communication Technology. In the second half, the com m unication technology will sim plify that context-specific catalog o f rules into clear m icrodirectives for the regulated individuals. W ithout that sim plification, the catalog o f rules w ould be too com plex and pose significant com pliance challenges. It w ould be im possible for peo ple to learn, rem em ber, and process all o f the requirem ents contained in the catalog. But advances in com m unication technology will produce m icrodirectives that reduce or elim inate those com pliance costs and prevent uncertainty costs that m ight other w ise arise.
T he m echanism for translation is straightforw ard. Com m unication technology will gather and transm it inform ation about the scenario in w hich the individual finds herself,30 identify the applicable rule from the vast catalog, and then translate that into a sim ple directive that is com m unicated back to the individual when she needs it. In this way, m icrodirectives will turn hundreds or thousands o f context-specific, m achine-generated rules into sim ple directives that are easy to understand and fol low. T he law controlling a particular scenario may take into account hundreds or thousands o f factors,31 but the individual will receive a sim ple com m and like a red or green light. W hen the output from the predictive technology is translated into a m icrodirective, citizens will be able to act as // they are taking into account more relevant factors than are hum anly possible. '2 * * *
To sum m arize, these technologies w ill com bine to do the follow ing. First, they regardless of the consequences of that behavior. She does not want to list out all permutations of immorality, so a rule will not work. Instead, she can start with a standard-immoral activity is prohibited-and then identify samples o f immoral behavior to feed into a machine. The machine can then use analytic and pattern recognition technology to determine whether other new scenarios would be deemed immoral by the lawmaker. We discuss below a similar process o f pattern recognition for the question of pornography that a lawmaker knows is pornography when she sees it. See infra Part II.A.2.
30. We include this fact-gathering function in our analysis of communication technology because the key innovation is the communication of the factual scenario from the specific context to the analytic process. The technology facilitating this communication is likely to be the same or related to the technology facilitating the communication (in the other direction) of the final microdireetive from the process to the individual.
31. To the extent that certain factors like race and gender are considered out-of-bounds, the machines can be programmed to ignore those factors. Indeed, it is easier for a machine to affirmatively ignore a prohibited factor than for a human.
32. These microdirectives share some important characteristics with McGinnis and Wasick's "dynamic rules." McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 1, at 1039-45. Both can be very precisely calibrated to specific conditions. But McGinnis and Wasick envision that at least the algorithm is "fixed by a rule" that must be changed if the "world may change in a way that makes another weighting o f factors achieve the legislature's original objectives." Id. at 1047-48. We suggest instead that one o f the core functions of a microdirective is the ability to learn from data and automatically update the weighting o f factors the way a judge would update her application o f a standard. In this way, microdircctives arc not rules. They update automatically and continuously to account for such changes in the weighting o f factors. But unlike standards they can be communicated ex ante with certainty.
will take a standard-like policy objective, analyze its application in all possible con texts, and create a vast catalog of legal rules-each of which is tailored to best achieve the objective in a specific scenario. Second, when a regulated actor is in any actual scenario, the technologies will search the vast catalog and identify the specific rules that are applicable. Third, they will translate those rules into a simple micro directive on how the regulated actor can comply with the law. Fourth, they will com municate that microdirective to the regulated actor in a timely and efficient manner.
C. Examples
To demonstrate the point, we present two stylized examples.
Example I: Predictive Technology in Medical Diagnosis
In this subsection, we provide an example that demonstrates how improved pre dictive technology-technology that allows lawmakers to better predict the outcomes of actions-will foster microdirectives.
Suppose you are a legislator. You are charged with determining when doctors should be liable for performing a risky surgery on a patient. How can you best regu late doctors' behavior? How can you best draft a statute that will help doctors under stand when their behavior complies with or violates the law? How many of the spe cific details should you include in the statute? How many of these details can be postponed until we have more information about how doctors behave in each case?
One option is to provide doctors with a clear and simple bright-line rule that dic tates the circumstances under which surgery should or should not be conducted. This simple rule provides great certainty to the doctors and is easily enforced; either a doctor complied with the rule or she didn't. A simple, precise ex ante rule would be your preferred method if similar patients frequently present with the same symp toms.'3 Under these circumstances, a rule would be preferred because the content of the law can be established just once, and there are enormous benefits from economies of scale.
But a doctor's decision to operate on a patient frequently turns on many different factors. A "one size fits all" rule here would likely not be optimal. Any simple brightline rule you enact will likely be overinclusive and underinclusive compared to an optimal decision rule. There will be some patients who receive surgery who do not need it (type I errors); there will also be other patients who do not receive surgery who do need it (type II errors).
To overcome these errors, you may try to write a more complex rule. To formulate this rule, you may try to think up many different scenarios, where you imagine dif ferent types of patients presenting with various symptoms. A complex rule is pre ferred if the cost of thinking and writing the rules is very low and the cost of doctors understanding and being able to comply with such a complex rule is also low. But it is often very costly for legislators to think up and write down all contingencies.
33. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 573-77 (discussing the importance of frequency in assessing the desirability of rules).
Further, the more complex the rule you write, the more difficult it becomes for a doctor to follow.34
Rather than implement a rule, another option you have is to enact a standard and evaluate the conduct of a doctor after the decision to operate (or not operate) has been made. That is, the decision to hold a doctor liable would be made once all the circumstances of the particular case are known.35 For example, the legal standard might stipulate that all doctors must take "reasonable care" in determining whether to operate on patients. This provides doctors with greater flexibility to decide whether or not the patient needs surgery.36 But it also provides an ex post adjudicator with the flexibility and discretion to determine what is meant by "reasonable."
If a patient suffers harm as a result of a doctor's decision, then a judge can look at all the facts as they actually occurred and make an informed decision as to whether the doctor took reasonable care. A standard would be better than a rule if patients and symptoms are heterogeneous and the likelihood of two patients with the same background and symptoms is very low.
There are, of course, costs associated with implementing and enforcing a standard. First, the cost of deciding each case is not zero. There are decision costs of learning the best course of action the doctor should have taken in the circumstances. Second, a judge may apply the standard incorrectly, either due to error or to bias. Third-and importantly-unlike a clear rule, a vague standard creates a great deal of uncertainty for the doctor. A doctor may not know how a judge will decide any given case; fur ther, different judges may decide inconsistently. If doctors are risk averse, a vague law can chill socially desirable behavior,37 and the uncertainty may generate consid erable expense in the form of compliance costs.
But in our hypothetical situation, let's suppose that a standard is optimal. Let's assume that the question of surgery rarely arises and that patients are highly diverse, both in terms of health backgrounds and in terms of the symptoms they present. For mulating detailed rules that cover all those situations and being able to communicate these complex rules to doctors would be difficult, and a simple rule would create high error costs. Case-by-case adjudication is not costless but it is preferred in our example because the infrequent cost of determining the content of the law ex post is 34 lower than the costs of trying to specify the law up front in all potential situations, many of which will never arise. Now let's examine how technology will eliminate this trade-off between rules and standards. Suppose that you learn of the existence of a diagnostic machine that is designed to predict when surgery is required. The machine takes into account rele vant facts about the patient38 -h e r history, the symptoms, and other relevant infor mation-to provide a best guess as to whether the patient requires surgery.
You, the legislator, have access to this machine. How does this predictive machine affect your decision to enact a rule or a standard? The answer turns on two factors. First, how good is the machine at accurately predicting outcomes? If the predictive technology is very powerful and the machine is able to provide precise and accurate information, then this points in favor of using the machine to create a rule, rather than relying on a judge to adjudicate a standard. Second, can this information be easily communicated to a doctor? That is, can lawmakers provide the doctor with timely notice of what behavior will comply with or violate the law?
Consider two scenarios:
Scenario 1: A terrible predictor
In scenario I, the machine is very poor at predicting when a patient re quires surgery. The machine essentially randomizes patients for surgery. The machine generates both type I and type II errors. One might think of the technology as a simple coin toss: heads for surgery, tails for no surgery.
Scenario 2: A perfect predictor
In scenario 2, the machine can predict with 100% accuracy whether a patient requires surgery or not. The machine instantly examines the pa tient's history and symptoms, analyzes millions o f prior cases, and reads all articles in medical journals. It then makes a perfect prediction. It is better than any human at determining whether it is optimal to have sur gery. There are no type I errors: patients who do not need surgery are not designated for surgery. There are no type II errors: patients who need surgery are designated for surgery.
Under scenario I, the technology should have no effect on your decision as a regulator to implement a rule or a standard. You should implement a standard and determine liability on a case-by-case basis, learning more about doctors' behavior over time.
Under scenario 2, however, the optimal form of the law will be different. The machine's predictions provide the exact content of the law. The machine provides microdirectives for each and every scenario. The over-and underinclusivity associ ated with simple rules have disappeared. There are no errors (type I or type II) in this scenario. And the costs incurred in thinking up and formulating such a complex rule have already been incurred in the development of this machine.39 The justification 38. In practice, the machine would actually take into account relevant information about the doctor as well, such as his track record with surgeries of the relevant type.
39. In reality many of the costs for developing the machine may have been incurred by for relying on ex post adjudication o f standards-reducing the error costs o f rules -is gone. Further, we have an added benefit o f elim inating uncertainty for the doc tors. I f they follow the directive o f the m achine, they know they will not be held liable. T he em ergence o f m icrodirectives and the death o f rules and standards as we know them do not rely on p erfect predictive technology. Rather, as the predictive technology gets better and better, we m ove aw ay from the w orld o f scenario I and tow ards the world o f scenario 2. T here will com e a point w here the technology is g o o d enough that the costs o f using a m icrodirective are sufficiently low so that there is no longer any need to use traditional rules or standards.
A caveat is necessary. T his tipping point can only be realized if the rules generated by the m achine can be easily com m unicated to doctors. T hat is, the legislator has to be able to provide the doctor with a quick and sim ple answ er to the question o f w hether the patient requires surgery.
D octors would find it difficult to follow com plex, com puter-derived rules. R egu lated actors have neither the desire nor the tim e to thum b through thousands o f pages o f legislation and understand com plex algorithm s. Rather, law m akers need som e form o f technology to allow a doctor to easily input all the relevant facts about a patient and receive an instant output that dictates w hether or not the patient requires surgery. O ne m ight im agine a w eb-based program or m obile app, w here the doctor can quickly and easily enter all relevant facts, subm it the inform ation, and instantly receive a binding ex ante opinion. Such technology is em erging and will be able to transform the com plex rules generated by m achine prediction into a sim ple directive that the doctor can follow . 40 The costs to the doctor in understanding the com plex rule will be dram atically reduced as this technology im proves. Even though the rule will be highly com plex and based on a sophisticated algorithm , from the perspective industry for the nonlegal benefits that the machine brings. In that sense, the marginal costs of using it for law are negligible. Moreover, even if the machine had to be developed specifically for law, that is a fixed cost that can be averaged across all applications when calculating the per rule cost. [Vol. 92:1401 of the doctor, the rule will be simple: operate or do not operate.41 We explore com munication technology further in our second example.
Example 2: Communication Technology in Traffic Laws
In this subsection, we highlight the way improved communication technology will facilitate microdirectives. Machines can almost instantaneously gather information, process it, and produce a useable output that directs how individuals should behave.
Traffic lights provide an example of this type of technology. They communicate the content of a law to drivers at little cost and with great effect. This notice technol ogy-combined with technology for predicting traffic patterns and driver behavior -creates an environment where lawmakers are able to replace vague standards and simplistic rules with crisp and increasingly complex microdirectives.
Electric traffic lights communicate to drivers precisely when they are required to stop and when they may proceed. Traffic lights appear to generate very simple rules: if the light is red, you must stop; if the light is green, you may go. But these rules are simple only from the perspective of the driver. From the perspective of the lawmak ers, the underlying rules are complex. The simplest underlying rule may dictate that cars must stop during regular, alternating time intervals. In more complex examples, the time intervals can vary by intersection, direction of traffic, or time of day.
If promulgated without traffic lights, these rules would be far too complex. Driv ers would have to consult tables that matched intersections, times, and directions with prescribed intervals of stopping. They would also have to consult precise clocks to determine when the intervals start and end.
The traffic light translates complexities into a simple command. From the driver's point of view, the lights provide a directive that is easily understood. And the law maker's cost of giving notice is low.42 Electric traffic lights take advantage of signif icant economies of scale that enable lawmakers to make complex rules, translate them into simple directives, and deliver notice of the required behavior to many drivers.
Moreover, while the command of the traffic light remains simple, the substance of the underlying rules is becoming more complex. Predictive analysis facilitates this process. Stopping at a red light when an intersection is deserted is wasteful and 41. It may seem odd at first that lawmakers are in the business of diagnostic technology. But this is no different from what judges do in medical litigation. Judges hear expert testimony and decide ex post whether certain behavior was reasonable. In our example, lawmakers just use expert technology to do that ex ante. It is true that the role of the doctor has changed -diagnostic judgment is less important-but that is the inevitable result o f advances in diagnostic technology. Our point is simply that in the hands of lawmakers the technology also changes the role of law. When the technology is only available to the private actors-the doctors in this example-then the evolution of rules into standards takes a slightly different path. We discuss this infra Part I.D.
42. These stop-go rules would be far more costly if humans operated traffic lights. Indeed, the first gas-powered traffic light used in 1868 in London, United Kingdom, was operated by humans. The Man Who Gave Us Traffic Lights, BBC: Nottingham (last updated July 22, 2009, 11:57 AM) , http://www.bbc.co.uk/nottingham/content/articles/2009/07/16 /john peake knight traffic lighls feature.shtml | https://perma.cc/4M28-DWR7].
costly.43 T hat rule is overinclusive. It w ould be better if the directive to the driver could change depending on the circum stances (as it w ould w ith a standard). To ad dress this, traffic lights in som e jurisdictions already contain sensors that detect and predictively analyze traffic flow and adjust the tim ing o f red and green lights accord ingly.44 Som e traffic lights contain detectors allow ing em ergency service vehicles to "preem pt" the signal and expedite their journey.45 In the near future, these system s will take into account m ore variables, such as the num ber o f cars, speed o f travel, or type o f intersection. T hey m ight even take into account personal characteristics o f a vehicle's driver or passengers.46 In the not-so-distant future, a traffic-light system m ay know that a passenger in a regular vehicle requires m edical attention and give the rushing driver a series o f green lights all the w ay to the hospital.
T he progress o f traffic lights show s how law m akers can define optim al policy outcom es (for exam ple, travel tim es and accident rates) and m achines can generate a catalog o f rules and exceptions to achieve those outcom es. A nd yet-even w hile the law m akers enact a standard and the m achines generate an increasingly com plex cata log o f rules underpinning the operation o f traffic lights-from the perspective o f the driver, the law will rem ain constant and straightforw ard: a sim ple stop-go directive.
T his phenom enon is not lim ited to traffic law. The forces at w ork here are ubiq uitous. T he invention and m ass adoption o f Internet technology has facilitated in stantaneous and cheap com m unication betw een individuals across all dom ains.47 It also, im portantly, allow s for im m ediate com m unication betw een law m akers and individuals. 43. There are other potential costs such as the increase in the number o f rear end traffic accidents caused by cars braking as lights turn yellow. We argue that these costs will also die out as the rule becomes more context specific. 48. Here, we discuss different channels through which technology will affect the law. In
D. The D ifferent C hannels Leading to the D eath o f R ules a n d Standards

The Production of Microdirectives by Nonlegislative Lawmakers
Legislatures are not the only lawmakers with access to technology. In many cases, the lawmaking power is entrusted to a regulator or enforcement agent.49 In other cases, judges make law. Those entities can also use technology to create and com municate microdirectives to regulated actors.
Regulatory microdirectives. It is likely to be more politically feasible for regula tors to develop microdirectives than legislators. The legislative path to enacting a computer algorithm is complicated. Pork barrel and horse-trading amendments to an algorithm do not make for successful programming. On the other hand, a regulator tasked with enforcing some legislated standard might easily adopt an algorithmdriven system of microdirectives. 50 The pressures on a budget-constrained regulatory body will push the agency to ward adopting technology. Likewise, trends towards cost-benefit analysis and re quirements that regulations be shown to be cost justified51 are likely to accelerate agency adoption. Predictive technology facilitates such cost-benefit analysis, reduces uncertainty costs to the regulated actors, and cuts down on ex post adjudication costs.
Congress could enact a standard and direct that these standards be administered by an algorithm-based system of microdirectives overseen by regulators or the regu lators could themselves decide to implement the standard in that manner.52
Advance tax rulings provide an example of an area for regulators to use microdirectives.5' As it currently stands, taxpayers may seek clarification of vague stand ards in the law by asking the tax authority to examine their tax arrangements and determine whether they comply with the code.54 A taxpayer may ask the tax authority to give a ruling on a matter that takes into account a number of factors such as: Am I a resident of the United States for tax purposes? Or, are my workers independent contractors or are they employees?55 other work, we have discussed the incremental nature of these changes. See Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 429 (2016) .
49. From the legislature's perspective, the delegation to an agency or enforcer takes the form of a standard. See Schauer, supra note 3, at 310. The legislature sets a broad goal and gives the agency the power to fill the content of rules.
50 52. This is not the same as traditional convergence predictions where rules become standards or standards become rules. Schauer, supra note 3, at 310-12. With microdirectives, laws take a new form that has some of the benefits of rules (more certainty) and some of the benefits of standards (better calibration) but fewer of the costs associated with either. These advance tax rulings bind the tax authority to the tax arrangements set out in the ruling, but only for the one specific taxpayer.56 Essentially the taxpayer is ask ing the tax authority to turn an ex post standard into a specific rule that applies solely to her circumstances. These advance rulings have a variety o f benefits. Most promi nently, they provide greater legal certainty to the taxpayer.57 They eliminate the un certainty costs o f the standard.58 But such rulings can be costly to generate.54 The tax authority is essentially engaged in personalized rule making. It is incurring high ex ante decision costs by enacting a rule that applies to just one taxpayer.60
Now imagine the tax authority could create a system where a taxpayer simply turns to a machine to answer her tax questions. She could, for example, turn to an agency website or a mobile app. She could ask the machine whether her tax arrange ments will expose her to liability and the machine could quickly read the entire tax code, all relevant cases, all associated regulations, and all relevant advisory opinions. The machine could immediately provide an answer to the taxpayer's question. 61 The tax authority, thus, could use this artificially intelligent machine to provide advance tax rulings. Depending on the underlying objective o f the legislature, the tax authority could use the machine to identify optimal rules that allow it to generate more revenue with greater efficiency and fewer distortions on market behavior. It could use this technology very broadly to choose very specific rules that are highly calibrated to legislative objectives without introducing compliance costs that would otherwise be associated with such complexity.
If regulators adopt these technologies, the answers provided by the tax authority would essentially become the red or green lights o f tax law. Even though the under lying tax laws would be very complex, the directives provided to an individual would be simple. Any enforcement agent could adopt technology o f this kind.62 As 56. In the United States, these rulings ("private letter rulings") are "binding on the IRS if the taxpayer fully and accurately described the proposed transaction in the request and carries out the transaction as described." Understanding IRS Guidance A Brief Primer, IRS (last updated July 6, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/uae/Understanding-lRS-Guidanee-A-Brief-Primer [https://perma.cc/RGV3-APFP]; see also 26 C.F.R. § 601.201 (a)( 1)-(2), (I); Givati, supra note 53, at 149-50. 57. Romano, supra note 53, at 77-78. 58. Givati, supra note 53, at 147. 59. Romano, supra note 53, at 277-80. 60. See Givati, supra note 53, at 149. As a formal matter, the rulings only resolve the relationship between the tax authority and one specific taxpayer. Further, they have no formal precedential effect for future taxpayers. As a practical matter, however, the tax authority is required to treat taxpayers consistently and so a de facto precedential value arises-but this does not rise to the level of a binding rule for all future cases. Id. at 158-61 (discussing the nuances of the precedential value of advance rulings and surveying the legal scholarship on the matter). 62. The Securities and Exchange Commission has a program similar to advance tax rulings where it provides "no-action" letters that state that the staff will not recommend enforcement actions against the individual or entity seeking guidance. The letter has no binding effect on other individuals or entities, and the SEC reserves the right to change its [Vol. 92:1401 predictive technology makes it easier to automate such regulatory advance rulings and ensure their accuracy, they will become a common mechanism for the adoption of machine-generated microdirectives.63
Judicial microdirectives. Aside from the legislator and the regulator, there is, of course, athird potential rule maker: the judge. But, as they currently function, judges do not quite fit into this model of law making. To be sure, judges could use artificial intelligence and big data to apply standards or complex rules.64 But judges are notat least in a formal sense-regularly in the business of providing ex ante notice of the outcomes of hypothetical scenarios.
For better or worse, advisory opinions are frowned upon by the American judicial system. Judges might use the predictive technology to refine the law ex post. But without notice to the regulated actors, those specific rulings impose some of the same costs as standards. For example, if judges announce that all negligence cases will be decided using a computer algorithm,65 a regulated actor without access to the algo rithm would still be faced with nothing more than a standard that imposes uncertainty Rev. 921 (1998) (describing the no-action letter process).
63. There will be some areas in law where the provision of advance directives is problematic. Tax provides a salient example. For some things, the lawmaker and the individual have aligned incentives. The individual wants to comply with the lawmaker's policy objectives and certainty makes compliance more likely. But for other things, the individual wants formal compliance with law but would prefer to avoid the policy objective. In other words, the individual is looking for a loophole. If the law provides a clear rule and the regulated individual would prefer to circumvent that rule, then certainty provides a road map for avoidance. See David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 860, 882 84 (1999) (describing the use o f "anti-abuse" standards to deal with rule avoidance).
In these spaces, it is difficult to predict how microdirectives will fair. On the one hand, the use o f microdirective technology to craft a precise law may shrink the space for avoidance. After all, a perfectly calibrated law will provide no space for avoidance. On the other hand, if the law has any imperfection and the regulated individual has superior private technology, she may use the technology to find the imperfections and craft her behavior (such as creating elaborate tax avoidance mechanisms) to avoid application of the microdirective. These arms race scenarios-where avoidance creates private benefits and private technology is in competition with the lawmakers' technology-suggest areas where standards, such as the anti abuse standard, will survive to supplement microdirectives. Still, the problem could be solved without standards. Revelation o f the microdirective could simply be delayed until immediately after the regulated individual took action. This prevents evasion but also commits the government to the rule ahead o f time to avoid bias. On the general idea o f delaying the revelation of rules to prevent evasion, see Saul Levmore, Double Blind Lawmaking and Other Comments on Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 915 (1999) .
64. Cf. Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 1436 ("Under certain circumstances, we want the courts (and advocates in the courtroom) to embrace the science o f Big Data as a means of deciding what terms ought to be imported into an ambiguous contract or will.").
65. The hypothetical scenario is not as fanciful as it may sound. The algorithm here is just a more precise amalgamation o f the expert opinions that courts routinely rely on in deciding cases. about how the ju d g e s will apply that standard. It w ould m ake little difference to the individual that the actual ju d g e happens to be a com puter.66
Things change if the regulated actors have access to the algorithm that ju d g es will use. In that w orld, the regulated actors can predict the outcom e w ith precision. If ju d g es com m it to using a certain technology that is available to the public, that would be equivalent to providing advance rulings.67 This w ould essentially shift the ju d g e 's role to that o f ex ante regulators. W hile not im plausible, w e think the avenues o f legislative and regulatory rulem aking will be m ore pervasive.
T here is another w ay that ju d g es could be involved in the prom ulgation o f m icro directives. Just as legislatures could set a broad policy objective and delegate the rule m aking to an agency, so too could the courts. In deciding cases, courts can announce a standard that blesses any rule that results from a process aim ed at the correct policy objective and that takes into account the relevant factors. T he agency could then cre ate an algorithm that does exactly that. T his " second-order regulation" by the court w ould send a m essage to the agencies on how to design the algorithm to ensure com pliance.68 H ere again it w ould be the agencies and enforcers who have the ultim ate responsibility for im plem enting the m achine algorithm to prom ulgate m icrodirectives. Rev. 205, 214 (2015) (defining a second-order judicial decision as one that "states its obligations in terms of ultimate goals that must be achieved. The [agent] is then free to achieve those goals in any appropriate way" (quoting Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 105 (1982))). 'This can be done for all standards including those that the court applies pursuant to the Constitution. See infra Part III. Rappaport's example of the court's second-order regulation of Fourth Amendment searches, Rappaporl, supra, at 220-22, is an area where the death o f rules and standards will be swift. Machine algorithms will be able to easily determine probable cause, exigent circumstances, bias o f officers, and the like better than humans. technology becomes more accurate we can expect more and more doctors to use it. At some point, it is likely that courts will begin to deem it per se unreasonable to not use such advanced technology. Imagine an orthopedic practice today that did not use an x-ray machine70 or a colorectal specialist who refused to perform colonoscopies in diagnosing colon cancer.71 As technology becomes more accurate and widespread, the likelihood that courts will base a reasonableness standard on the use of that tech nology increases. The proliferation of these technologies across industries will cause behavior that complies with standards to function exactly as if it were complying with a microdirective promulgated by the predictive technology.
The second path is a softer version of our main thesis. This path does not require lawmakers to use technology. Individuals can use predictive technology to provide predictions on how judges will apply a standard.72 In this way, technology improves on the role of lawyers as compliance advisors.7' When lawyers provide compliance advice, they are, in part, predicting how ex post adjudicators will apply a standard.74
As computers can gather and analyze more and more prior cases, they will outperform lawyers at this task. On first blush, this advance would appear to reduce the compliance cost o f standards. But it does so in a way that effectively turns the standard into a microdirective, as it reduces the costs of legal uncertainty because it tells the individual exactly how to behave. As Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, a pre diction of a judicial outcome is the law.75
Advances in big data and artificial intelligence will spawn intelligent machines that can predict legal outcomes with great accuracy. 76. See Katz, supra note 11 (exploring the power of big data to predict legal outcomes); see also Poral & Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 1436 (same). that traffic is regulated only with yield signs that impose a reasonableness standard.77 But in this world, consumer technology has advanced to a stage where it can predict when a court will deem yielding to be required under the standard. This private tech nology provides a mechanism for informing the driver when she must stop under the law. The technology gathers the relevant facts, applies the standard to those facts as ajudge would, and provides predictive analysis.
Even though we have standards and private technology, the resulting behavior looks as if we had public traffic lights with underlying complex rules. And compli ance is as simple for the driver as it would be with a microdirective. The driver simply gets a message saying stop. She does not have to even take mental note o f the under lying facts. As technology makes ex post adjudication more predictable, citizens treat a prediction as a rule. They receive directives ex ante and have little uncertainty about how the law requires them to behave. This may lead lawmakers to simply enact those predictions as law. It is possible, though, that lawmakers may deem fully predictable ex post adjudication to be the satisfactory equivalent o f a microdirectives and not take the final step to formalize the microdirectives into law. But from the individual's perspective the transfor mation will be already complete. Drivers will know to stop when the technology in their car gives a signal-the equivalent o f a red light.78
II. Feasibility
In this Part, we examine the feasibility o f using technology to generate micro directives. This Part is divided in two main sections. First, we examine the feasibility o f predictive technology. We look at examples where big data and artificial intelli gence have been used to generate better predictions and insights than humans ever could provide, and we look to where the technology is headed. We look at how such predictive technology has dramatically diminished the need for human discretion.
Second, we examine the feasibility o f communication technology. For the most part, this technology is already here and steadily improving. Mobile devices are be coming our first port o f call for information. Individuals can easily and quickly com municate with other individuals, and-more importantly for our argument-law makers can easily and quickly communicate with regulated actors.
A. The Feasibility o f Predictive Technology
There are two key takeaways from this section: (1) machines are, in many areas, 77. See, e.g., 625 III. Comp. Stat. 5/11-904(c) (West 2016) (requiring that a driver at a yield sign slow to "a speed reasonable for the existing conditions" and stop "if required for safety"); Mass. Gen. Laws 89 § 9 (LexisNexis 2012) (same); Pierce v. Coltraro, 252 So.2d 550, 552-53 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (noting the standard that applies at a yield sign).
78. It is possible that judges, knowing about the predictive technology, will (consciously or unconsciously) respond by changing their behavior. If that were true, and assuming that advanced algorithms could not account for the changes when making predictions, that would suggest that technology for predicting judicial outcomes would lag behind other predictive technology in effectiveness. This alternative path toward the death of standards would, therefore, be less likely than the paths through legislative and regulatory rule making.
[Vol. 92:1401 already better at predicting outcomes and behavior than any human; and (2) this tech nology is improving so rapidly that the superiority o f machines in predicting out comes will continue to grow at an exponential rate.
Machines can process billions of data points instantly to determine an optimal course of action. Even the most competent, objective humans cannot compete with algorithms generated by big data and artificial intelligence. We are producing and analyzing ever-increasing stores of data that will provide the backbone of predictive technology. It may be difficult to envision these longer-term trends, but as Bill Gates has noted: "We always overestimate the change that will occur in the next two years and underestimate the change that will occur in the next ten."79 One can only imagine the extent to which we underestimate the change that will occur in the next twenty years, or by the end of this century.
In this section, we first explore how technological developments will improve the prediction of human behavior by better understanding and analyzing millions of hy pothetical situations. We foreshadow the future growth of cognitive computing, arti ficial intelligence, and evolutionary algorithms to show how these powerful new technologies will facilitate the emergence of microdirectives. We then look at how human discretion is being replaced by computer-based rules in all professions and argue that law is no different.
I. The Power of Predictive Technology
Big data and artificial intelligence have reached a stage where likely outcomes can already be predicted in many aspects of human life.80 By the end of the last cen tury, computing machines were able to defeat the best grandmasters in chess.81 A decade later, an artificially intelligent machine destroyed the grandmasters of the television trivia show Jeopardy!*2 Indeed, machines outperform humans in many areas of life.81 They can predict consumers' taste84 and advise clients on financial 79. Bill Gates, The Road Ahead 316 (1996) But tod ay 's use o f big data and algorithm s to predict outcom es is ju st the begin ning. T he capacity o f com puters to process inform ation and collect and store data continues to explode.87 The D irector o f Engineering at G oogle, Ray K urzw eil, re cently noted: "T h ere's a very sm ooth exponential increase in the price-perform ance o f com puting going back to the 1890 census."88 As econom ist P rofessor W illiam N ordhaus notes, the increase in com puter pow er over the course o f the tw entieth century w as "phenom enal," 89 im proving m anual com puting pow er by a factor o f betw een 1.7 trillion and 76 trillion tim es with an explosive trend beginning only after the Second W orld W ar.90
T he grow th in com putational pow er has closely tracked " M oore's L aw " over the past fifty years.91 M oore's Law is the observation that the num ber o f transistors in a dense integrated circuit doubles approxim ately every tw o years.92 T his observation has proved rem arkably accurate and is now used as a guide to understanding w here com puting will be in the future.93 If the trend continues, then w ithin tw enty years, com puting pow er will be 1000 tim es w hat it is to d a y .M T hat trend will allow com puting technology to expand its influence. In the sam e way that city planners have already developed com puters that track aggregate traffic flow s,95 governm ents will likely be able to collect and use data on how hum ans [Vol. 92:1401 behave in almost all aspects of life. But the growth of data collection and analytics will not be uniform in all areas of law. The evolution will be fastest where regulated actors' behavior is more frequent and more homogenous. In these situations, lawmakers will have more data on how individuals behave. Where behavior is less frequent and more heterogeneous, the predictability of behavior will initially be weaker.
In the long run, however, artificially intelligent machines will not be bound by the limits currently facing big data.9'' Artificially intelligent machines are not simply pro grammed with a given structure to anticipate every possible contingency and every possible answer. Rather, artificially intelligent machines are trained to predict, infer, and intuit behavior and adapt to new and unique situations.97
Artificially intelligent machines find "hidden" or "deep" connections in un structured data to provide stronger predictions.98 In some sense, these machines are capable of "learning."99 They update to take into account whether their best guesses are correct or not. In doing so, they amalgamate the wisdom of crowds.100 Artificially intelligent machines marshal this wisdom better than traditional statistical techniques because the machines craft their own learning rules, rather than relying on a poten tially biased structure imposed by humans.101
Predictive Technology Will Displace Human Discretion
In the near future, more perfect algorithms will begin to displace lawmaker discretion. While this displacement of human discretion may appear novel in the legal sphere, it is simply a manifestation of the Moneyball phenomenon highlighted by Michael Lewis. 102 In the book Moneyball, Lewis explores the use of data in major league baseball to elucidate the idea that statistics and data, used correctly, are superior to human judgment. Scouts and coaches in baseball previously relied on the "look" of the player to predict whether a player would make it in the big leagues.10' But they were wrong. Their hunches were really just manifestations of years of inherited biases, prejudice, and outdated modes of thinking. Taking advantage of this, the Oakland A's used statistical analysis to consistently outperform rivals who had greater financial resources.
The lesson here is that humans and their hunches are unreliable. 105 Examples can be found everywhere. From bankers assessing loan applicants106 and employers hir ing prospective employees107 to commercial pilots flying planes, 108 humans increas ingly place their trust in machines and discover that outcomes predicted by big data are systematically better than human intuition.
The phenomenon is starting to permeate the field of law. Consider how judges set bail. The decision to set bail has historically been based on a standard. The judge weighed a number of factors, such as the seriousness of the alleged crime, the likeli hood of guilt, whether the defendant had jumped bail before, the defendant's social ties and employment situation, the defendant's mental condition, and so on. 109 See, for example, the standard in Massachusetts where bail is determined by examining the alleged crime, the likely penalty, the likely flight risk, history of defaults, family in the area, employment status, and previous criminal records, among other criteria. Mass [Vol. 92:1401 list of potentially relevant factors is almost inexhaustible.110
But now some jurisdictions are turning to predictive technology to reduce un certainty and inconsistency in judges' decisions, as well as to reduce the time taken to set bail.111 Algorithms have been developed that seek to predict when particular defendants will likely skip bail.1" The predictive power of this algorithm, which takes into account data on the defendant's characteristics, far exceeds that of any individual judge." ' This output from the data is more systematic and reliable than an individual judge's hunch. The algorithm reduces error costs (it is better at assessing the likeli hood of a defendant jumping bail) and decision costs (judges can simply apply the algorithm). Judges without the algorithm have less information and cannot process the information they do have as efficiently.
Moreover, judges introduce bias into the system by considering irrelevant factors. A well-meaning judge may not even know when she is considering irrelevant factors. A machine does not suffer from this problem. Relatedly, machines can be instructed to ignore factors that we do not want the law to consider. Thus a machine can be told to ignore race, gender, religion and the like even if they are relevant to an outcome objective. It is much harder for a judge to affirmatively ignore subconscious impacts of such factors."4
These observations run counter to the idea that there is something "special" and "human" about the law and legal reasoning."5 Almost every profession thinks their profession is special.116 In the same way that most drivers believe that they are above average,"7 humans reflexively believe that their judgment and reasoning is special 114. For machine algorithms, the instruction to ignore prohibited factors is not perfect. Other allowed variables may perfectly correlate with and therefore inadvertently proxy for out-of-bounds factors. These are sometimes called "clones." To the extent a lawmaker wants to exclude a factor from calculation, a programmer has to account for the correlation of clone variables.
115 Rev. 349. 355 (2016) (testing whether judges have a unique "situation sense" expertise based on training and experience).
127. Kahan. supra note 125.
Professor Kahan compares the profession of lawyers to the profession of chick sexers who determine the gender of one-day old chicks. To the untrained eye, there is nothing discernibly different about newborn male and female chickens. And yet some people with training from a "chick-sexing grandmaster" can examine a chick and tell whether it is male or female with ninety-nine percent accuracy. Amazingly, no one (not even the chick sexers themselves) can say exactly what these experts are looking for. They simply know the difference when they see it. Professor Kahan claims that this "special power to intuitively perceive the gender of a newborn chick" is analogous to how lawyers determine the difference between "good and bad deci sions." 128 Professor Kahan argues that lawyers learn how to reason in a special way, and that is what makes the craft o f good lawyering so "distinctive" from other professions.129
Within four years o f Professor Kahan's address, the world of chick sexing had changed dramatically. Predictive technology had been developed that could accu rately determine the gender of a chick before birth.130 Just as the machines defeated the grandmasters of chess and Jeopardy!, this new predictive technology bested the grandmasters of chick sexing.
Professor Kahan's address was not about the effect of technology on law. But the fate of chick sexers illustrates a major point: there is nothing so special about indi vidual human intuition-at least in practice-that makes it immune to displacement by technology. Whether pure (unbiased and unrushed) human intuition is special and beyond replication is an unresolved philosophical question. But in application, hu man intuition is imperfect and biased. And machine technology can, it turns out, do as well as humans even when the individuals themselves cannot adequately describe their intuitive process.
The shortsighted belief that the legal profession is special and that lawyers and judges are immune from displacement by technological advances hinges on a bias that leads one to believe that only a human can deliver such wise judgments and decisions. Yes, lawyers require judgment. Yes, judges require judgment. But, the judgment of one human is outweighed by a decision generated by technology that takes into account millions ofjudgments and decisions.13' To see where this is all going for law, consider how artificially intelligent ma chines may turn one of the most classic statements of a standard in U.S. legal doctrine into a microdirective. In Jacobellis v. 131. See Surowiecki, supra note 100. One might also note that judgment is about making the right decision in the absence of full information about outcomes. Once the outcomes are known, that sort of judgment is in a sense unnecessary.
132. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184. 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id.
Justice S tew art's view suggests that distinguishing betw een pornography and nonpornography is som ething that hum ans can do, but it is difficult to w rite an ex ante rule that clearly defines the line. Justice S tew art preferred to leave the determ i nation as a standard, to be resolved later.
A rtificially intelligent technology can already recognize and analyze im ag es.134 It is not ju st a ju d g e w ho can "see it." In the near future, artificially intelligent m achines will be able to develop highly com plex rules that generate im m ediate and sim ple predictions o f the legality o f particular m aterials ("this im age is/is not porno graphic" ). Just im agine that Justice Stew art identified fifty pornographic im ages for the com puter. At that point, the artificial intelligence program s can find deep con nections to identify the pattern that is driving the distinction, but that Justice Stew art could not articulate. Indeed, such pattern recognition is one o f the areas w here this technology is already w ay ahead o f hum ans. And it is w hy the technology is thought to be so valuable as a diagnostic tool.
If such technology w ere im plem ented, the law on the books m ight still look like a standard; but an individual could refer to the m achine output to get advance m icro directives and behave as though she w ere governed by a rule.
B. The F easibility o f C om m unication Technology
Can law m akers adequately give tim ely notice o f the law to regulated actors? Can they provide these individuals with instant notice o f how best to com ply with the law? In the sam e way that traffic lights let a driver know that she should stop, com m unication technology can give rise to a world w here all laws are reduced to stopgo directives that are instantly com m unicated to regulated actors. In this subsection, w e discuss the types o f technology and infrastructure that will facilitate this.
The costs o f com m unication have been alm ost obliterated by the Internet. The socalled Internet o f T h in g s135 is an interconnected netw ork o f physical objects and de vices that are em bedded with electronics and sensors to allow products to be con trolled and used rem otely by the user or m anufacturer. Recent estim ates suggest that betw een 50 billion to 100 billion objects and devices will be em bedded with such technology by the year 20 2 0 .136 M obile applications are becom ing the first port o f 134.
Four Microsoft researchers have developed a visual recognition program that has an error rate of 4.94%, less than the 5.1% error rate of a human. Kaiming He. Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren & Jian Sun, Delving Deep into Rectifiers: Surpassing Human-Level Perfor mance on ImageNet Classification, 2015 IE E E In t 'l C o n f . ON COMPUTER VISION 1026, http://www.cv-foundation.org/opcnaccess/contenticcv_2015/papers/FIe Delving D eepinto _lCCV_2015_paper.pdf | https://perma.cc/PC3A-87SQI. According to one report, Japanese cameras are even being used to identify whether subway passengers arc intoxicated. Amber Bouman, Clever Cameras Detect Drunken Railway Passengers in Japan, ENGADGET (Aug. 13,2015) , http://www.engadgct.com/2015/08/13/clever-cameras-detect-drunken-rai 1 way-passengers -in-japan/ [https://perma.cc/RW3E-DVKQI. The Internet of Things and mobile applications are not, however, simply ways to improve the consumer experience. Lawmakers can use this technology. The Internet will facilitate immediate communication between lawmakers, regulators, individu als, and corporations. Take, for example, the field of environmental regulation. Regu lators could more easily monitor emissions of factories through the Internet of Things. Regulators could instantly determine when factories are exceeding their lim its and quickly inform firms operating those factories of the violation.
The example of advance tax rulings above suggests that the IRS will be able to provide immediate compliance information to individuals and corporations using similar technology to the Internet of Things. Regulated actors could enter infor mation into a web-based or mobile application and receive a ruling on a device (like a phone) or some wearable technology (like a watch) from the regulator in a timely manner.
Such infrastructure already exists. For example, cardiologists today can simply refer to an app, enter in relevant information, and be given the optimal response for a patient.138 As technology improves on the fact-gathering front, individuals may not even be required to enter much data into the programs; rather, devices will simply recognize the contours of the factual situation and give notice of whether the indi vidual is complying with the law.
Indeed, lawmakers could even provide notice of microdirectives when the need for it is immediate. Individuals could wear items, such as contact lenses, that instantly analyze a situation and give an immediate directive as to the legality of a potential action. The military is already experimenting with this type of technology for iden tifying combat targets.139 But more mundane uses are also probable: Can you turn left at an intersection? Can you cross the street? Can you attempt to board that sub way car? And so on.
The 139. In an attempt to avoid (or, at least, minimize) friendly fire and fratricide, military scientists have developed combat identification technology (known as "Identification Friend or Foe" or "IFF") that can more easily and more quickly identify whether combatants are friendly or enemies. 
III. Implications and Consequences
In this Part, we explore some implications and consequences o f our predictions. If microdirectives become the dominant form o f all law, these implications will be profound. But even a short-run trend in isolated fields o f law will have major impacts on the way we think about law. We will focus on the long-run version o f our predic tion to demonstrate the scope o f possible changes.
We suggest that the microdirectives will emerge as a new form o f law that reduces the uncertainty costs o f standards and the decision and error costs o f rules. There are, however, other costs that may arise from a world o f microdirectives. While the law will generate less uncertainty and fewer errors, it may be deficient in other ways. Here, we identify four areas where the consequences and potential costs o f the emer gence o f microdirectives may be substantial. First, it will change the broad institu tional balance o f power in our political and legal system. Second, it may change the development and substantive content o f legislative policy. Third, it will transform the practice and training o f law. Fourth, it will have moral and ethical consequences for individual citizens, altering their day-to-day decision-making process and chang ing their relationship with lawmakers and government. In the remainder o f this Part, we explore these implications and consequences in general terms. We conclude by noting how the existence o f these costs may or may not affect our prediction.
A. The Death o f Judging? Institutional Changes to the Legal System
The death o f rules and standards will produce a shift in the balance o f our political institutions. The proliferation o f clear microdirectives largely obviates the need for ex post adjudication. This reduced role diminishes the ability o f judges to influence the law and increases the power o f ex ante lawm akers.141 The change in the structure o f the law does leave some room for some ex post adjudication o f evidentiary ques tions, but even that will be reduced as the technology for observing facts ex ante improves.
140. C f Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 12 (discussing fact-gathering technology for personalized default rules).
141. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 2, at 261 (" The legislature's choice whether to enact a standard or a set of precise rules is implicitly also a choice between legislative and judicial rulemaking."); see also Schauer, supra note 3, at 3 10 ("According to the conventional wisdom, therefore, the choice between rules and standards . . . is an important and powerful implement of institutional design, determining much of who decides what in a complex and multiinstitutional society."). In this sense, the death of rules and standards precedes the death of the judicial function. [Vol. 92:1401 This is potentially concerning because w hen ju d g es decide cases they do m ore than sim ply apply rules or standards. T hey also have the ability to shift and m odify the law. This can happen in at least three different w ays. First, ju d g es can interpret a law (rule or standard) differently than the ex ante law m akers intended-assum ing those law m akers even had an identifiable intent.142 Judges can also choose to ignore rules and standards altogether in the guise o f interpretation.143
Second, ju d g e s can influence popular and institutional views about policy objec tives. Judges can im pact popular opinion by highlighting a particular issue in a case, using their position to m ake policy statem ents, or by issuing increm ental holdings that generate support for m ovem ents that have broader co n seq u en ces.144 A ddition ally, given the U.S. federal system , decisions o f courts in one ju risd ictio n m ight have larger social consequences that impact nonjudicial change to policy objectives in other ju risd ic tio n s.14 ' M any think that this role o f the courts in challenging stale and & Econ. 60,64-67 (2015) (showing that different judges writing different opinions in the same case cite different prece dents and lean toward precedents that align with each judge's political preference) ; William Hubbard & M. Todd Henderson, Do Judges Follow the Law? An Empirical Test o f Congres sional Control Over Judicial Behavior (Coase-Sandor Inst. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 671,2014) . But see Anthony N iblett, Do Judges Cherry Pick Precedents to Justify Extra-Legal Decisions?: A Statistical Examination, 70 M u L. Rev. 234 (2010) .
144. The legitimation hypothesis suggests that public opinion will begin to converge toward the opinion of the court after a court has handed down a decision. See, e.g Q. 109 (1995) . There is prominent literature discussing "backlash" to court decisions that have the opposite effect of the legitimation hypothesis. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Now Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. Am. Hist. 81 (1994) . Others suggest that the effect is more constrained. See, e.g., Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (1991 Rev. 299(1998) .
145. For example, in 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that same-sex marriage was legal. Goodridge v. Dep'to f Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) . Scholars entrenched views has a salutary effect on our dem ocracy.1 * * * * & * * '" Finally, judges can outright declare policy objectives to be improper or un constitutional.147 This judicial review o f legislative policy is considered by many to be an integral part o f our system o f checks and balances. 148 These lawmaking roles o f judges will change along with the fundamental nature o f law. Judges will lose much o f their oversight and lawmaking power. For non constitutional questions, the interpretive role may disappear entirely."9 They will no longer have the power to reinterpret or ignore laws. The policy objectives o f law will be set by the ex ante rule makers (legislative or regulatory). And the judiciary-at least if it maintains its current form and structure-will have little or no occasion to question or change those policy objectives. The opportunities for statutory interpre tation and filling in the gaps in vague standards will dry up as citizens are simply instructed to obey simple directives.
have debated the effect that this decision had on public opinion and whether the subsequent change in public opinion set the law on a new path, culminating in the Supreme Court of the United States finding a constitutional right to same-sex marriage in 2015. See Michael J. t he concern here is a separate question than whether machine-aided algorithms can implement policy objectives. The question is whether there is an independent branch of government with the power to question the policy decisions of the ex ante lawmakers. When the lawmakers decide on legislative objectives and parameters for the machine algorithms, do we want a separate branch of government to review those decisions? If we do, the reduced role of the judiciary is troubling.
Moreover, the number of cases litigated will plummet. The question in most cases will simply be whether or not the citizen complied with the simple directive. The case will have two questions: Was the light red? And did the citizen stop? The evi dence to answer those questions will continue to be more readily accessible. As the number of cases and controversies litigated falls and the interpretation of policy be comes unnecessary, a judge's opportunities to use a case to make policy statements and impact opinion will diminish. On the other hand, the judge's opportunities to inject bias and error will also diminish.150
Things are a little more complicated for questions of constitutional law. In theory at least, constitutional standards151 are no different from the standards we have dis cussed throughout this Article. A machine could easily be programmed to tell us whether a particular search was unreasonable,152 whether certain speech was pornog raphy, whether microdirectives are valid under the commerce clause or some other provision, and so on.
There are institutional structures, however, that may appear to be barriers to the promulgation of microdirectives for constitutional review. As our regime currently stands, neither Congress nor any agency can dictate that a machine algorithm will decide the constitutionality of laws. If Congress creates an algorithm that takes into account race or results in the prohibition of speech, the courts-and not a machinewould declare those algorithms unconstitutional.
As long as Marbury v. Madison15 ' remains good law, the constitutional decision on an algorithm would have to come from the judiciary. But the courts could, of course, bless the use of particular types of algorithms going forward, deeming these to be constitutionally proper. For example, an exigent search that was conducted pur suant to a machine directive could be presumed to be reasonable if the machine used a judicially blessed algorithm. This precedential guidance to regulatory agencies154 could essentially provide the policy objectives that must guide the microdirective technology for constitutional review. This delegation would facilitate the promulga tion of microdirectives in the constitutional law space.
Some, of course, may argue that reducing judicial power over policy is a good thing. As the democratically elected branches become more powerful, for example, fears about overreaching by unelected judges will be dampened. disagree.156 For those who advocate the active role of judges, alternative mechanisms for that role might be pursued. Perhaps a judiciary that provides advisory opinions on legislative and regulatory policy decisions could preserve the judiciary's oversight and influence on society.157
B. The Development and Substance o f Policy Objectives
In addition to policy decisions moving away from judges, the process by which legislatures and regulators make those decisions will change.
Broader objectives. As we noted above in Part I.D., regulatory agents will be the primary force behind the shift to microdirectives. Legislatures may continue to enact standards, but they will leave the machine-aided implementation to regulators. Those standards may be nothing more than a statement of the policy objective that should guide the rule-making machines. Regulators will then translate that broad objective into specific sets of rules generated by machines.158
Additionally, the ability to achieve broad goals through machine-derived micro directives will potentially allow legislatures to state their objectives at increasingly higher levels of abstract social policy. Rather than concern themselves with details of implementation, the legislature will be able to concentrate on the bigger picture. For example, instead of worrying about specific speed limits, the legislature will fo cus on the purpose of traffic law: does society want laws that reduce accidents, mini mize travel time, reduce fuel consumption, or some perfect mix?
At its extreme, learning algorithms aided by big data could be asked to prescribe a vast set of microdirectives covering multiple fields to achieve an even broader so cial goal, such as maximizing welfare, minimizing accidental death, minimizing wealth inequality, or (more likely) some combination that sets certain acceptable thresholds for these and other social values. This becomes possible because lawmak ers no longer have to figure out and set out each precise rule and its connection to other rules. Instead, machines will work out the millions of connected micro directives that achieve a stated slate of policy objectives. This complex catalog of microdirectives can be targeted to small instances of behavior that fit within a larger web of behavioral actions to achieve a broad goal.
Faster change. Algorithm-driven laws will automatically and rapidly adapt to the circumstances, optimizing according to the objective of the law. But changes to the law result in winners and losers.119 Frequent changes to the law may impose addi tional risks on individuals and may affect the willingness of individuals to invest in 156. See sources cited supra note 148. 157. On the other hand, it is possible that the influence on society requires actual cases and controversies to make judicial rulings more salient.
158 525 (1992) (exploring and [Vol. 92:1401 projects that may be subject to legal uncertainty.160 A smart machine will, however, be able to take into account any effects on the values of reliance investments to find a global optimum, rather than merely a local optimum.
Moreover, predictive technology can be used to advise lawmakers on other po tential unintended consequences of certain policy objectives. Under today's system, laws frequently have unintended consequences. Laws that change behavior in un expected ways that undermine the law's goal or disrupt some unrelated area of hu man behavior in unexpected ways are common.161
With the current state of technology, it often takes years before the consequences of a policy decision are fully understood. But as big data and predictive technology improve, lawmakers will be able to more accurately identify these consequences at the time when they make the rules.162
Unintended consequences. The potential for unintended consequences highlights an important facet of the death of rules and standards. Those who set the broad poli cies in this new world will need to have deep understandings of both social objectives and the way that these technologies work. Machine-generated microdirectives can only reduce unintended consequences if the machines are programmed to identify the types of consequences about which policymakers or society care. The humans who instruct machines to create microdirectives must communicate policy objectives to the machines in ways that do not distort the message, and they must "ask" the machines to provide assessments of the consequences of proposed objectives.
If lawmakers do not have a deep understanding of policy consequences and pro gramming, the machines may distort rather than further law.163 Such concerns ani mate many science-fiction movies about the fears of artificial intelligence.164 The modeling the costs imposed by government transitions).
160. The fact that such uncertainty leads to a reduced ex ante investment is a manifestation of the hold-up problem. Rev. 894 (1936) . An example of a recent legislative change with un intended consequences occurred when the Ontario government increased access to the small claims court, which had a regressive effect, with richer plaintiffs displacing poor plaintiffs. 162. The technology may, however, get ahead of itself. While predictive technology re duces the chance of unintended consequences for any given law, it also increases the rate at which laws can be promulgated. If the rate of promulgation increases fast enough, unintended consequences may increase even as laws become more accurate. We must know more about how eager lawmakers will be to promulgate microdircctives to understand how significant this risk is.
163. In the literature on artificial intelligence, this is referred to as "perverse instantiation." See, e.g., Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, 146-49(2014 165 Can G oogle cars, they ask, deal w ith ethical questions that face hum an drivers? O ne com m entator notes that hum ans believe that avoiding a collision w ith a dog is m ore im portant than avoiding a collision with anim als that are not pets (like sq u irrels).166 But m achines-if program m ed correctly-could replicate that value ju d g m en t and, given the advances in predictive technology, w ould execute the ju d g m en t w ith greater accuracy than a hum an. On the other hand, if the com m en tator is w rong-and squirrels are to be avoided with the sam e care as dogs-then the program can be changed accordingly."'7 The key, then, is in the law m aker's ability to program that value into the m achines.
Still, som e appear to w orry that poorly program m ed cars will im plem ent a fright ening system o f social values w here they sw erve to kill the "w rong" p eo p le.16* Im plicit in this critique, how ever, is the false idea that hum an drivers alw ays sw erve to kill the " right" people. It w ould seem that the trick in getting all o f this right is not in program m ing the com puter, but in som ehow agreeing on w hich people are the "right" ones to kill. T hat is an age-old m oral problem to w hich w e still do not have an agreed-upon answ er. Thus, the so-called "trolley problem " 169 is, indeed, a real one for self-driving cars. But that is a fam iliar critique on the lim its o f hum an ethics, not on the lim its o f self-driving cars. In other w ords, it is still a problem for hum andriven cars too.
In any event, lawmakers o f the future must be able to translate society's values into programmable objectives for the machines. The task o f identifying those values, it seems to us, will remain a human one.170
C. Changes to the Practice o f Law
The observations thus far lead naturally to the next related observation: the death o f rules and standards will fundamentally transform the practice o f law. For years, a chorus o f scholars have been pointing out that technology will disrupt and transform the practice o f law .171 We join this chorus to note that as lawmakers adopt laws that are translated and communicated to citizens as simple microdirectives, the role o f lawyers will change dramatically. The role o f compliance and litigation lawyers will diminish, while the role o f a lawyer as lobbyist or policy advisor will grow.
The compliance lawyer today serves as an intermediary who advises a client on how best to comply with complex rules or vague standards. Part o f the expertise o f a compliance lawyer is in predicting how an ex post adjudicator will likely apply the relevant standard to a certain set o f facts.
Thus, in our tax example, a client might ask a lawyer whether or not her business arrangement complies with the standards o f the tax code. In our medical example, a doctor might ask a lawyer whether her diagnostic procedures would be deemed rea sonable under the controlling legal standard. The lawyer reads the relevant law and exercises her judgm ent-based on education, experience, and other expertise-to provide a prediction. The lawyer may go beyond a yes or no answer and suggest creative ways that a client could alter behavior to increase the likelihood that the adjudicator would find the client in compliance.
Technology will reduce the need for such compliance lawyers. The citizen will simply be told directly whether behavior complies with the law or not. There is no need to consult a lawyer to ask whether a traffic light is green or red. Similarly, liti gators will no longer be in the business o f arguing about the application o f standards, and judges will no longer be in the business o f applying them.
There will be skeptics. As discussed above in Part II, even though technology has already displaced many labor markets, there is a common sentiment that many hold that their profession is different and somehow immune to technological disrup tions.172 But simply noting that a compliance lawyer's role as information middleman will disappear is not to say that the entire profession o f law will be automated. Rather, there will be a shift in the types o f tasks that lawyers are charged with. Lawyers will be forced to adapt to the new environment.
Setting the policy directives o f a machine algorithm is complicated. To tell a ma chine that its objective is to minimize traffic accidents, without more, would lead to 170. There is a possibility that machines could simply observe human behavior and from that deduce what objectives the majority of persons would do and follow that behavior. That would eliminate even the need for human policy considerations. We reject that possibility -not because the computers cannot do it. but because few would agree that entrenching ob served majoritarian behavior is the appropriate objective of law.
171. E.g., Susskind, Tomorrow's Lawyers, supra note 11; Henderson, supra note 11; Katz, supra note 11; Ribstein, supra note 11.
172. See supra Part II.A.2.
standstill traffic-or, more absurdly, the prohibition o f motor vehicles. Instructing the machine to minimize travel times could lead to an abundance o f car accidents. A machine can only write rules to meet the objective as it is presented. As we have discussed, the humans who set the objective must be able to understand the conse quences o f different objectives and must be able to understand which objectives are desirable. Understanding the implications o f different objectives requires not only an under standing o f the technology, but also a highly interdisciplinary understanding o f hu man behavior and the goals o f our regulatory state. The trend o f the last fifty years toward interdisciplinary legal education,17 ' with an emphasis on understanding topics such as economics, psychology, philosophy, history, and so on, is one that will serve this new role o f lawyers well. We note in passing that recent countertrends toward so-called practical lawyering174 are likely to be wasteful. The idea o f training lawyers solely in practical skills provides little benefit when the skills required are likely to change rapidly. The understanding o f legal policy should remain the focus o f the legal endeavor because human individuals will set the high-level policy objectives for the law .175
D. The Broader Consequences o f These Technologies on Individuals
The death o f rules and standards will raise major concerns about privacy, auton omy, and the ethics o f human decision making.
Privacy
Most obviously, as with all applications of big data, the use of data gathering to predict outcomes raises privacy concerns.176 These concerns have been addressed extensively in other contexts.177 In our context, the potential for invasions of privacy is high. Government-controlled machines will be gathering data about individual be havior and using that information in two ways. First, they will use the information to assess an individual's behavior and provide a legal directive. Second, they will use the information as part o f its aggregated data that goes into setting the micro directives. Stoplight cameras and GPS tracking already create the ability for the gov ernment to know a citizen's comings and goings. These capabilities to invade privacy will increase. And the concerns become greater when the government uses the infor mation it gathers in conjunction with technology to predict future actions by an individual. 178 There is a trade-off here. The more limitations placed on the government's ability to gather information, the weaker will be its ability to create precise micro directives.179 Moreover, there may be privacy-based calls for the halting o f micro directives because the mere prediction based on aggregate data violates principles of privacy.
The debate and policy choices on privacy here are likely to track general debates and choices about privacy and big data. One can also expect that as individuals con tinue to waive privacy in private-law contexts,180 public law will be given additional freedom to gather information that facilitates the evolution of microdirectives.
A utonom y
As law m akers prom ulgate m ore precise m icrodirectives to advance broad policy objectives, the scope o f law can expand. Take, for exam ple, a broad policy objective that seeks to increase productivity. In the hands o f a pow erful algorithm , m icro directives aim ed at a broad goal like that could dictate virtually every decision in a citizen 's life. Sm art traffic lights could decide w ho goes first based on productivity levels. Sm art restaurants could dictate w hat a citizen is allow ed to eat for b reak fast.181 This presents real concerns for individual au to n o m y .182
But these concerns are not direct objections to the use o f predictive technology. Rather they are objections to reckless law m aking or to overreaching. Law m akers have to understand w hat objectives to use in setting m icrodirectives. Improving productivity m ight be one policy objective, but there m ay be other constraining ob jectives that should be factored in, such as respecting certain spheres o f individual decision m aking. If principles o f hum an autonom y require the law to allow hum ans to m ake certain decisions even w hen those decisions are inconsistent with other so cial values, then the law m akers m ust be aw are o f those principles and avoid en croaching on them w hen they set policy objectives. T his reinforces the im portance o f law yers and law m akers as interdisciplinary policy experts.
T he w ell-trained expert law m aker m ight still overreach. T he technologies we have described provide the tools for alm ost lim itless law m aking. A goal to increase productivity at all costs is difficult to enact through legislation today-the infor m ation costs are too high. But that will not be the case with m icrodirectives. As the inform ation lim its on law m aking fall, it will only be political costs that restrain those in pow er. As in our discussion o f the dim inished role o f ju d g es, this once again coun sels in favor o f attention to institutional structures.
A final and perhaps even deeper concern is that law m akers may turn the m icro directives into actual physical restraints on action. Rather than tell you that the light is red, the technology o f the future m ay sim ply prevent your car from m oving. A self driving car with no d river override could be entirely in the control o f the law m aker.181 181. There is no doubt that such outcomes would be controversial, as the debate over the 182. The concept of autonomy in law and philosophy is deeply controversial. See, e.g., Sarah Conly, Against Autonomy: Justifying Coercive Paternalism (2013). Professor David Strauss has noted that "autonomy is a notoriously vague notion; there is a danger that any attempt to justify a principle in terms of autonomy will slip into question-begging assertions about the nature of truly free and rational human beings." David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom o f Expression, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 334, 354 (1991) . Still, there is no question that individual autonomy is implicated by the power o f the state to create limitless microdirectives to achieve virtually any legislative objective. But that does not necessarily alleviate the concern. There is perhaps an ethical value in having a human making important instant decisions rather than placing our selves on a course of action that cannot be reviewed in the actual moment. We sus pect that a large part of what is going on here is lingering skepticism about accuracy concerns, which we addressed in Part II. People often trust human hunches more than complex machine decisions even in the face of evidence that the machines are more accurate. Perhaps it is a fear of the unknown. But as we have noted above, there is little evidence that humans will be systematically better at making these decisions than machines.
Still a deeper philosophical problem remains. Something that makes us human might be lost when lawmakers use machines to make all of our collective value judg ments in advance (even if those judgments are accurate) . 190 This may be at the root of the fear with which people view artificial intelligence.
These are pressing ethical problems that will face lawmakers in the future. The current trend is toward microdirectives that reduce in-the-moment ethical decisions. To understand whether that is a good thing, lawmakers must engage with philoso phers and ethicists on these questions as the evolution to machine-derived micro directives progresses. * * * Before concluding, it is worth noting an implicit assumption in our prediction: the implications and consequences we discuss here will not themselves prevent the death of rules and standards. One might think that if the institutional upheaval and auton omy concerns are great enough, lawmakers will reject the move to microdirectives. We do not see this happening. The growth of predictive technology is robust. The lure of accuracy ("getting things right") and the regulated actors' desire for certainty are powerful forces that will dominate political and legal debates. The more nuanced considerations we discuss in this Part will, we think, be sidelined.
In that sense, our prediction is about the law's current course. Those who believe the costs of that course are unacceptable should focus on methods of alleviating these costs or finding means to intervene and change that evolutionary path.
C o n c lu sio n As machines become increasingly intelligent, and continue to outperform human judgment, the influence of artificial intelligence will spread far and wide. The tech nologies we have discussed are already being used by doctors to detect cancers, by consumers to optimize their search for products, and by financial advisors to provide advice.
189. See, e.g., Lin. supra note 165 (noting that humans are presumed to be able to make ethieal judgments, whereas computers have an untested track record). [Vol. 92:1401
The legal system will not be immune from this trend. We have suggested through out this Article that this technological revolution will dramatically alter the founda tional structure of law as we know it. Predictive technology will generate greater ex ante information that can be used by lawmakers to write highly specific, complex laws. And individuals will receive notice of these complex laws in a simple form thanks to technological advances in communication. This will be the death of rules and standards and the rise of microdirectives.
These developments will have profound implications for the role of judges, leg islators, regulators, lawyers, and individuals in the legal system. But beyond that, we will have to change the way we think and talk about law. Take, for example, the classic debate between legal realists and legal formalists.191 Without ex post adjudi cation, this debate changes radically. As standards disappear and judges have pro gressively less influence, legislative intent will be entrenched and concretized in the catalog of microdirectives.
Technological changes that vastly improve ex ante information will also breathe new life into old law-and-economics models that began with an assumption that law makers and citizens have full information. Friction in these models caused by imper fect and asymmetric information has provided a fertile source of material for critics, both inside and outside the field of law and economics. But these models will be given renewed importance. Similarly, the public choice literature will have an in creased emphasis on how legislators choose objectives, rather than how they imple ment laws, while academic interest in subjects such as judicial behavior will dissipate.
All of this is to say that legal institutions of all types will change radically. We are witnessing an information revolution. And, like other technological revolutions, it will precede a legal revolution. The industrial revolution, for example, saw human labor replaced by machine labor and the cost of transportation fell markedly with inventions such as the steam engine. It greatly reduced transaction costs and had widespread impact on all spheres of law including contract law, 192 property law,191 employment law, 194 criminal law, 195 and tort law. 196 The information revolution has already resulted in dramatic changes in the world of commerce. For example, companies such as YouTube, Uber, and Airbnb have disrupted and uprooted heavily regulated and stable industries. The coming techno logical revolution will lead to similar disruption of the legal services industry, but the effect on law will be much deeper and far wider. It will affect the very structure of legal commands and the way we, as a society, choose to govern the behavior of citizens.
